Monthly Archives: November 2009

$1.3 million lost in blatant but failed attempt at insider trading?

The blogosphere made the catch! The Interweb protects the rest of us from evil doers! The world is ablaze with the news that prior to the 3Com buyout announced by HP last week, there was an unusual amount of volume in the $5 november call in 3Com. We’re all pretty sensitised to insider trading at the moment, and so this looks as clear cut and beautiful a case of  evil-doers caught with their hands in the till as we are likely to see in our time on earth. As Tyler Durden puts it:

This is so blatant it is sufficiently stupid that even the SEC will presumably catch the perpetrator. Here’s to hoping the trader ends up being Galleon’s Raj Raj buying options from his E-Trade account while on bail. Of course, we fully expect any prosecution case against the perpetrator to fall apart at the seams courtesy of a completely inept legal team at the SEC and the Justice Department.

Oh really? Before the Zero Hedge folks get the pitchforks out, let’s stop and think a bit. Let us be splitters, and not lumpers, and we might see that would be quite reasonable for the SEC and DoJ not to prosecute anyone at all. Using the principle of Occam’s Razor, they may well tend to conclude that no insider trading took place. At least not in the options, the underlying or common may be a different matter.

Let’s get technical here. In the case of the unusual volume in the 3Com options, you should know that incredibly unusual volumes in options is not terribly unusual, if you follow me. It is in fact the case that the volume of a particular option resides, as Taleb would have it, in Extremistan. It is subject to many many days of low and limited trading, and very few days of extremely high volume, orders of magnitude above the norm, where most of the total volume traded in the life of the option takes place.  This occurs most notably in the final month of the option’s life. This is so because people are more likely to buy a particular option when its intrinsic value (the portion of the option price described by the difference of the strike and underlying prices and its volatility) is highest in proportion to its time value and its total value. This is when you get the most “bang for your buck”, as Baruch puts it — roughly 2 weeks before expiry, the option is in its prime, near its most efficient for hedging and speculative purposes.

That’s what people use options for, mostly. Hedging, and speculating. Options are excellent as a way of profiting moderately, or reducing losses, in conditions of risk and uncertainty. As a way of playing a dead cert, however, options are pretty crap. Had someone concrete knowledge of the 3Com deal, it would be far more efficient to buy the stock. The most important of the “Greeks”, as options dudes call the panoply of statistics surrounding options, is “delta”, the rate of change in the value of the option relative to the value of the shares (it’s a function of volatility, time to expiry, a whole lot of stuff, don’t trouble your head), and this is always less than one. 3Com options buyers made far less money on the takeover by buying options than they would if they had bought the stock.

Assume the 4,000 Novs and the same in Dec calls that day came from a single buyer. S/he bought an economic interest in 800,000 COMS underlying. Purchased at 65c and 85c, both calls popped post the announcement to $2.50. Hooray, a profit of $1.4m. But trading the underlying, buying at $5.611 would have given $1.52m profit. The other thing favouring the underlying as the vessel for insider speculation was that it was so much more liquid than the options. Buying 800,000 COMS would have been a drop in the lake of the volume that day, which saw 22m shares change hands. It would also have been much, much less conspicuous, and we wouldn’t even have a story. These were pretty stupid inside traders, indeed, who not just left money on the table by playing the options, but drew extra attention to themselves by doing so.

Though of course, if you want to insist on the inside trading thesis, you can always posit insiders with limited funds who couldn’t afford 800k underlying shares. So the DoJ in its inquiries should be able to exclude institutional investors. Or at least competent ones. But come on; is it the simplest explanation? Or is it actually a stretch?

Perhaps it was insider trading, but we have to posit incompetent and poor insiders for the thesis to work, and while possible this seems less likely than other explanations. A less complex interpretation for the COMS trade is that shorts, not long insiders betting on a takeover, got spooked and decided to hedge. Over 10m shares of COMS were shorted at the end of October, a proportion which might have remained stable into the takeover. Rumours fly about all the time, and 3Com has been known to be a takeover target since like forever. A 20% to 50% gap move in a big short can seriously spoil your day, if not your year, and a call position is an excellent way to hedge, to take the sting out, to make an existential 50% loss into, say, a merely unpleasant 10% one. When COMS has cancelled a roadshow, you’re seeing weirdly high volumes and a breakout, it’s actually pretty prudent for a short to hedge a bit with calls against a takeover.  

This sort of trade, moreover, happens all the time. Just this Friday, PALM November $12.50 option volume went through the roof; never mind a measly 4,000 contracts, they traded 21,000 on the day. The occasion was the the ridiculous suggestion, no doubt assiduously spread by inscrupulous holders eager to get out with some honour, that Nokia would be taking them over that weekend. The volume can probably be explained by the fact that PALM is probably the most shorted tech stock around at the moment, and more likely than not it was this lot, not numpty spanners who actually believed this crap, who bought most of the calls to cover their arses just in case. It would have been evidence of insider trading, of course, had there been an actual takeover at the end of it, and no doubt we would all be tut-tutting about the state of the markets today and how it’s all stacked against the little guy.

As it is, there wasn’t. At least there hasn’t been yet. And the owners of the options, who bought at 65c (they last traded at 23c) have until friday for the takeover to happen, after which the options will expire worthless with PALM at its current price. That will be $1.3m down the tubes. If that was money for speculation, it would have been painful for all but the biggest fund. If it was merely shorts paying up for insurance against getting their faces ripped off it would be more than bearable. You tend not, after all, really want your hedge to be making you money.

“To speculate,” the prophet said, “is human. But to hedge is divine.” The game is not just stacked against the little guy, it’s stacked against everyone, which is why some cheat. At least the little guy probably has a day job. It’s not wrong to be aware of what is probably widespread insider trading in stockmarkets today. But it’s probably very important to aim for the real evil-doers, the ones who pay executives to “get the quarter”, who know exactly what the company is going to print to the decimal point, and who have covered the tracks of their entry in a way specifically designed not to be noticed. We should get these guys, they suck, and Baruch can only applaud the FBI for the way they have handled the Galleon case. But we do need to stop and think before we throw premature accusations that may get innocent hedgers into hot water and don’t help anyone to make the game fairer.

An article wherein it is explained why everything written so far about Apple’s iPhone launch in China is beside the point.

Baruch, you know how hard I, Bento, try to refrain from commenting about Apple on this blog, but it appalls me how it’s been several weeks since the iPhone launched in China and still none of you pundits has caught onto Apple’s strategy here, not even accidentally through sheer volume of keyboard combinatorics. I think I shall help along the process a bit.

Apple is not selling iPhones in China because it wants to sell iPhones in China, but because it wants to sell iPhones to the Chinese. That’s a big difference. I’ll explain.

The Chinese have long had access to iPhones. They are for sale at stalls in every cybermall and market in every Chinese city, and come in two varieties: The most expensive ones (at around 6000 RMB in Shanghai for a 16GB 3GS, or 880 USD, depending on your haggling skills) come directly from Hong Kong, where the factory-unlocked model is available from the Apple store for around 4800 RMB. That’s a nice arbitrage play by the stall owner, and everyone is happy. The cheaper model, at around 5000 RMB for a 16GB 3GS, was originally bought locked in the US or Europe, and has been unlocked by the stall owner’s hacker-genius cousin using 3rd-party software. This kind of iPhone is cheaper, because you are on your own when it comes to upgrades and iTunes compatibility.

The distribution model is extensive and robust, and in fact most Chinese buy their mobile phones from stalls like this. There are no iPhone shortages, as prices fluctuate to meet demand. The received wisdom is that around 2 million iPhones are in the Chinese wild; I’ve personally seen a good many of them here in Shanghai, where they are much in evidence among the eliterati. Still, this is a minuscule portion of the 700 million odd phones in use in China, of which a small but growing portion is smartphones.

What can Apple do to grow the number of iPhones on mainland China? Short of lowering prices in Hong Kong (not going to happen) it can do two things: Increase awareness of the iPhone via advertising, and bring the benefits of a Chinese-language App Store to Chinese iPhone owners.

To do either of these, you sort of need to sell the product locally first, though. Apple can’t really go round putting up banners in Chinese tier-3 cities urging consumers to head for the local iPhone aftermarket. Unfortunately, an ill-conceived Chinese law forbids selling mobile phones containing wifi functionality (unless it is the wifi variety developed in China that nobody uses) so if Apple wants to sell iPhones in China, it has to first cripple them.

Why anyone would buy a wifiless iPhone beats me, especially if it is more expensive than the arbitraged unlocked Hong Kong model. Apple seems to think the same thing, because it is not revenue-sharing with China Unicom, the local vendor, but selling the iPhones outright to them. It is up to China Unicom to flog them in China.

And that’s what China Unicom is trying to do. China Unicom stores all have iPhone banners up; I’ve passed several China Unicom road shows stopping by Shanghai extolling the iPhone. The iPhone is being talked about widely. But so is the fact that the China Unicom iPhone is crippled — the Chinese are sophisticated consumers; forget this at your own peril.

The upshot: anecdotal reports tell of aftermarket prices increasing for Hong Kong iPhones these past few weeks, as demand increased. Clearly, the advertising is working, even if China Unicom’s sales of wifiless iPhones are anaemic.

There is a certain poetic justice to the whole spectacle: China Unicom, a state-owned company, forced to sell inferior iPhones in a porous market due to stupid laws promulgated by the Chinese state, spending on advertising that mainly benefits the aftermarket for Hong Kong iPhones.

China Unicom will also be a useful partner for Apple to secure a Chinese iTunes App store. It isn’t there yet, in part because this kind of venture inside China requires the involvement of censors (and you thought Apple was an overbearing app gatekeeper…) but as per China Unicom’s own admission, the process is underway. Once such an app store exists, of course, anyone with a Chinese credit card and an iPhone will be able to partake, whether or not they bought the iPhone from China Unicom.

But I believe Apple is not just doing this to get advertising and an app store into China, important as this is for growing sales to the Chinese. I believe the intention is to pressure for a change to the law, simply by making the the absurdity of the situation so plainly visible. This is speculation on my part, but there is a precedent: Egypt.

In November 2008, the iPhone came to Egypt, but without GPS. That’s because there was a cold-war era Egyptian law on the books that banned civilians from possessing GPS devices. The law was unenforceable, with plenty of foreign-bought GPS-enabled devices in the hands of tourists and archaeologists and wealthy Egyptians. The only people suffering were the local vendors, which couldn’t sell anything with GPS in it. Apple garnered some criticism with this move, for kowtowing to authoritarian rule. But the GPS-less iPhone also put the spotlight on the law, making many people aware for the first time that Egypt was one of only three countries in the world where GPS use by civilians was banned. Egypt’s regime hates that sort of loss of face, and by April 2009, the ban was lifted. Egyptian iPhones these days come with GPS, but the win is for everyone in Egypt.

Is China up next? It’s now in China Unicom’s interests to have the anti-wifi law changed, so that they can sell a larger portion of the iPhones ending up in Chinese hands. That kind of incentive makes me optimistic. Apple has already cracked the Chinese market for wifi-enabled phones — via Hong Kong. Now China Unicom needs to do the same — by getting its owner to change the law.

Inside Men

Crikey. Looks like they’re going after Stevie Cohen now. For context, SAC Capital is the leading hedge fund of our time. They get to charge not 1 and 20, not 2 and 20, but 3 and FIFTY to their punters. And like La Gavroche, they get to decide who gets in; most of the funds are closed, with waiting lists up the wazoo. They’ve done this through nothing but creating consistent, (suspiciously?) persistent, 20% plus returns a year for god knows how long. SAC is the “smart money” you would follow if you knew where it was going; Baruch has known traders do that, no questions asked. And why? Because you just reason that they know something; they always do. How ominous that sounds now.

If SAC goes down like Galleon did it’s a much much bigger deal. I don’t mean the trading impact on the market, although there might be some — SAC is a rapid-fire trading house and will likely be positioned in mostly highly liquid securities. What I mean by a bigger deal is in an Ivan Boesky sort of way, a Drexel Burnham Lambert, a Defining Moment of Wall Street Greed sort of thing. A number of awful mini-series will be made about it. It may even turn out to be worse than that.

It’s clear too, the other half of the vast conspiracy (should it be proven to exist, of course) lies among technology stock executives, at least among those high enough up the chain to know the numbers. So far, at least, executives at IBM, Intel, 3Com, Atheros, and Polycom are supposed to involved. This is a highly representative list, across many tech subsectors and market caps. It’s not unreasonable to think staff at other companies are going to be indicted. Galleon’s original investors seem to have been tech executives who used to talk to Raj when he was a sell-side analyst, ie his sources, his informal “channel checkers”. Even if no brown envelopes changed hands initially, secretly advising a fund you have invested in p.a. on sensitive stuff doesn’t seem a stretch on the part of the executives, especially if it took place before RegFD. The relationships may have then become formalised, secrets in exchange for cash — is it unreasonable to imagine that the original conflict of interest sowed the seeds of the greater, and more obvious crime later on. If I was one of the Feds working the case I would view identifiying the early and later investors in Galleon as an avenue of enquiry rich, shall we say, in possibility.

Now it’s not just Galleon involved, but a horde of satellite hedgies with obscure names, and some of the managers who have started to cooperate with the authorities seem to have worked at SAC. “People familiar with the matter” (ie most likely the prosecutors themselves) have told the WSJ that SAC are the ones they’re gunning for. Given the size of the target, the prosecutor who can pull off this one is, on past form, a dead cert to be mayor of NYC, or at least state governor, and eventually will have the chance to become a cross-dressing presidential candidate.

If indictments are really going to be sent out, a number of half-formed thoughts spring to Baruch’s mind:

  1. this is grist to the mill of the “you can’t make money in the stock market crowd”, the Felix Salmons of this world* who would have us all invest in index funds and ETFs. This is terrible, not just for people like me who depend on belief that a small number of gifted investors are capable of consistent, though not necessarily persistent, returns. No, it also, reductio ad absurdiwhatever, will make the stockmarket less liable to make any distinctions between companies whether they be good ones or bad ones — the very life force of capitalism itself
  2. highly successful “fundamentalist” hedge funds may now have to spend as much time excusing suspiciously excellent performance, just as more unfortunate ones have had to traditionally spend time explaining away bad returns. In many cases this may be difficult, as the successful ones no doubt touted their “informational edge” as a way of getting the investors in in the first place.
  3. because of this I can’t decide whether this is good for us honest fundamental investors, or bad. At worst, the boundaries of what we consider ethically and legally acceptable may stray. What we could call the “brown envelope” investment strategies are clearly not kosher, but what about ones where legitmate “homework” brings about the same result? How exactly is a sell-side channel check, communicated to a limited number of paying clients, conceptually different? Insider trading as a concept does not have hard edges, and innocents may get caught up in the net, or much worse, be encouraged to stop doing any digging at all. Maybe investors will conclude that all the fundamental investment strategies are at risk, and eschew the class altogether in a “kill them all, god will know his own” sort of way. At best, however, the money invested in dodgy funds may find a home with more honest practitioners, and, much more to be hoped for, fund investors themselves may reset unrealistic expectations for consistency of returns. Larger drawdowns will become more acceptable, as will greater volatility in monthly and quarterly track records. In other words, expectations will become more in line with what the real world actually doles out.

* of course, Felix Salmon has many other opinions, some of which are even correct.