Baruch: big in Japan

Imagine what Baruch found in his daily Abnormal Returns troll last thrusday, Bento! It seems 2 academic dudes, one Yuqing Xing and another Neal Detert at the Asian Development Bank Institute in Japan, took a look at the iPhone and the US-Chinese trade deficit, and realised that high tech products such as the iPhone, which are merely assembled in China, distorted the picture. Very little of the value of the iPhone comes from, or remains in China, yet the full value of the iPhone is counted as a Chinese export for the purposes of deficit calculation. The official numbers are wrong, therefore, and the “real” deficit is much lower.

All well and good, and jolly interesting too. So much so that it was picked up by the WSJ, Paul Kedrosky, and of course, Tadas at AR.

Baruch certainly found the article interesting, as these were thoughts very similar to those he set down over one year ago in a blogpost here called What’s an export? Seriously. In it, after examining the supply chain of the iPhone* in some detail, he concluded that high tech products which are merely assembled in China distorted the picture. Very little of the value of the iPhone comes from, or remains in China, yet the full value of the iPhone is counted as a Chinese export for the purposes of deficit calculation. He wrote

Presumably to work out the real trade balance in terms of where trade flows, or where the wealth generated by iPhones goes, classifiying it as a {Chinese} export for the purposes of assessing a trade balance is misleading . . . Where there are totally integrated global supply chains, I suspect that the definitions of “import” and “export” begin to lose meaning.

Baruch was confused: why did economists and politicians harp on about the trade deficits like this when it  assessing the true value of the deficit was so obviously problematic? The post ended with a plea:

If there are any professional economists left reading UB, please help.

“Help” in this case, did not mean “purloin my idea and publish it in your own name for the glorification of your career without so much as citing poor old Baruch.”

What do you think Bento? Can I sue?

*happily, Xing and Detert also make a hash of the foodchain of the iPhone. Toshiba does NOT make the touchscreen and display module of the iPhone, though may be implicated in the NAND memory; touch module is left to an obscure-ish Taiwanese company called TPK, the screen could come from a whole passel of suppliers, but probably not Tosh; the apps processor is only “fabbed” by Samsung but is a design owned by Apple, Infineon does not make the “camera module”, though does make the baseband and some other stuff. Etc etc.

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Baruch the political football

James Suroweicki is using Baruch’s (rather good) line, the “undead homicidal zombie market”  as grist to his anti-anti QE2 mill.

What’s most striking about the attacks on QE2 is how hysterical they are. People aren’t just suggesting that the Fed’s policy—which is quite modest relative to the size of the U.S. economy—might be ineffective or mildly inflationary. Instead, they’re accusing the Fed of “injecting high-grade monetary heroin” into the system, pursuing a policy that “eviscerates” the middle class, and potentially giving birth to an “undead homicidal zombie market.”

The main problem with this of course, is that this last bit never happened. No-one ever accused the Fed of potentially creating an undead homicidal zombie market.

What Baruch actually wrote (my emphasis) was:

“I’m not saying we’re in an undead homicidal zombie market,”

And there we could let it lie.

Although to be fair, I did add “though we may be” as quite frankly I was not very sure of anything at that particular moment. Communicating this lack of certainty was the point of the post, which was about feeling confused and worried. But nevertheless, in the offending line above, Baruch was trying to stop going too far down the path of a metaphorical flight of fancy about undead cats. To avoid, if you like, hysteria.

So James S. has it completely arsy-versy. Clearly he hadn’t actually read Baruch’s post, and by the way James, in the unlikely event you ever read this one, if you do choose to misquote me disapprovingly the least you could do would be to drop us a link, no? Probably you have an outdated editorial policy that prevents you from doing so, but still, this is the 21st century.

Calling one’s opponents “hysterical” is, moreover, quite a cheap rhetorical shot, a debating tactic much used by Straussian neo cons and WSJ op ed writers to close off a reasoned argument they are on the wrong side of. Different words that do the same job are “partisan”, and (Baruch’s favourite) “shrill”. If someone is hysterical it is much easier to ignore the points they make. Rather, the word implies, they just need a hard slap and a good shake. The word has the stench of politics about it.

That’s the wider context here, which I think we need to put James’ article into. QE2 has become politicised, and this is a mark of just how demented US political discourse has become. Domestic bond purchase programs elsewhere don’t generally create similar levels of controversy between parties; most politicians realise their central bankers are just following through with their mandates, as the Fed clearly is, without any regard for political advantage. Baruch thinks the blame for the politicisation lays squarely at the feet of congressional republicans. He also finds it highly amusing to find himself somehow lumped in with this lot, however indirectly, as he has yet to contemplate a more priceless, ill-intentioned, irresponsible and ignorant set of economic baboons.

But the worry is that if the republican baboons don’t like QE2, then it follows that those on the other side of the aisle will start to like it, not on the basis of a reasoned weighing up of pros and cons, rather because it gives them good talking points. The result will be the vaguely uncritical lumpen thinking we see in the New Yorker article, and at its worst, an item of pragmatic economic policy which should be debated on its merits will join the pantheon of topics of almost theological controversy in the US such as abortion, gun control, flag burning and gay marriage. Pretending that QE2 is a well established economic policy without risk of externalities is frankly as absurd as saying it is an unmitigated evil.

Felix, whose own position is not far from Baruch’s, does a much better job of tackling the article in this post. As he puts it, “the weird thing is that Surowiecki and I actually agree on most of the issues here.”

Indeed. As things stand right now, Baruch is very rapidly coming to terms with QE2: not particularly astonishingly, the thing might actually be working! There are green shoots everywhere he looks , from an apparent increase in volume at transaction processing companies, to semi makers guiding for much lower seasonality in the next quarter, to positive 2011 GDP revisions by the economists, to strategists telling me to buy cyclicals, etc etc. The price of gold even dropped a bit on thursday. He is pretty optimistic, certainly much more than he was last month, when his problem was that he could see the sufficient reasons for stocks to rise (QE2), but not the efficient ones (forward EPS estimates going up). That’s been solved, confusion lifted. Things are great!

Then again, that’s exactly what I’m supposed to feel, isn’t it? There’s nothing like turning up to a party with a hangover (swearing you’ll only stay for a bit), having that first drink and realising how much fun you’re going to have if you stick around. Thoughts of a potentially much worse hangover yet to come are far away.

Through the looking glass again

I’ve been catching up on my reading and dear Bento, if anyone tells you they have a clear view on what is going to happen to the econo-world from here, walk away briskly. As Ed Hyman of ISI* puts it, with the now imminent onset of QE2 we are in “scary times”, a world of “unintended consequences”.

The only intellectually honest position to take at this point, it seems, is to admit we haven’t a clue. Personally I, Baruch, am getting really confused. My default setting is that we will muddle through and everything will be OK. But the cone of potential outcomes that surround that base case is now as loose and flappy as a wizard’s sleeve.

Note also that even the “muddling through” scenario doesn’t presume any particular level of the S&P at the end of the next 12 months. Plus or minus 30% and in Baruch’s view we’d still be all right.

Where to start? Well, here’s a list of the factors that I think are going to make us move, in the form of a dialog in Baruch’s head. None or all of them could dominate. Maybe some are already priced in. Some of them I hope are  made up and will go away. There’s nothing particularly original here I admit, but I want, at this juncture, to sum up where we may be. Baruch’s future self might find it interesting. Here goes:

1) we are getting QE2! It will save us from Japanese-style deflation. Yayy!

2) Yes, but this is not necessarily a good thing. QE2 is the first move, the invasion of Poland if you like, in the coming currency war against everyone who is good at exporting, especially the Chinese. In the ensuing cycle of “bugger thy neighbour”, we will descend into massive disruption of trade and runaway inflation. Oh no!

3) But don’t worry. The Chinese are going to make structural reforms in their upcoming 5 Year Plan which will massively boost consumption over the next few years. The Yuan will rise anyway, no matter what the result of the horrible currency shenanigans, and their ensuing import boom will be the engine dragging the world out of debt-deflation! Yayy!

4) Hang on. I’ve just had some bad news. The financial system is insolvent again. All the mortgages securitised in the past X years stopped being asset backed, as they umm. . . lost the paperwork. The holders can’t foreclose, and the people who have been foreclosed on may have had their houses taken away illegally. Many may have to get their houses back. So stuff that the banks still own has to be written down again. Hell, even the people who can pay their mortgages have a big incentive not to any more. We’re totally fucked.

5) Don’t worry! All that crap’s been written off already or backed by the Feds! Isn’t it? They can’t be as stupid to have it still on their books, right? While we may have jeopardised a couple of banks, the Foreclosure Crisis may also have solved the US consumer debt problem! All the mortgages will be cancelled!! As long as a few banks can survive we still got QE2, massive Chinese consumption growth AND a reset to US private indebtedness. Those crazy Americans can now re-re-mortgage their houses and buy another round of LCD TVs for their McMansions, and reinstate the semi-annual holidays in Disney World! We can’t lose!!

6) Not so fast, cheeky monkey. The US banking system may be meta-fucked. Turns out the banks who securitised mortgages may have defrauded their customers and broken the law, because they secretly did in fact do some due diligence, and knew all the mortgages were rubbish. There is no better person to tell you about this than our old mate Felix; who says bloggers can’t do journalism? Good news: bankers may not be the total idiots we thought they were. Bad news: they were fraudulently criminal instead, and apparently may have to pay cash at par for all the stuff they all wrote down already, plus a bunch of extra fines.  Even if the SEC throws up its hands and the DoJ doesn’t want to prosecute, I imagine foreign prosecutors won’t be so shy if there’s a case to be heard. Certainly you would think a civil case would be worth a shot, and if proven, I can only imagine the settlements. I hope they remember to ask to have the checks made out in Yuan.

7) You poor sap. You ridiculous perma-bear. Bernanke has our backs! You don’t think he doesn’t know this stuff already? You were wondering why he was so keen to rush into QE2 despite the positive turn in the leading indicators, and pump us all up before the mid-terms. You got it now? We’re going to get the mother of all easings, bigger than the trillion dollars everyone’s expecting, something open-ended, maybe.

Anyway, that’s as far as I got. Any better ideas out there? Anything I missed? Is any of it wrong? Can you help poor old Baruch make sense of it all?

* ISI is the only macro strategist my team actually pays for, everyone else seems to offer their opinions for free

Myths about stockmarket myths that just won’t die

Baruch hasn’t stopped blogging. He’s just been busy at work. To be fair, there also hasn’t been that much he has wanted to write about.

That changes here! A recent and growing animus in the econoblogoverse to, of all things, equity markets, has woken him up. Baruch finds this fairly incredible. Equities, he is fairly convinced, are the asset class of the future. This anti-equities movement, led by jealous journalists and winking, cackling bond apologists with axes to grind, needs to be nipped in the bud, as it is dead wrong. The WSJ’s otherwise reasonable Brett Arends is Baruch’s immediate target among the evil-thinkers, for his (last week’s top read on Abnormal Returns) The Top 10 Stock Market Myths that Just Won’t Die. And that Felix Salmon is also guilty as sin in this, for many offences against shares committed over the past few years.

Myth 1: stocks don’t generally go up

Wronngggg! Try shorting for a living and see how long you last. I’ve tried it. It is *really* fricking hard. Actually this year my shorts have made me more money than my longs, but I am an investing genius, and you are probably not. To those bond apologists who claim that this “stocks for the long haul” stuff is bullshit, I urge you to actually count the number of 10 year periods since 1950 where stocks have not made you a net percentage gain. I can only see 1963-64 and 1999-2001 as periods with evident losses (check out the S&P log chart from 1950). So around 90% of the time in the past 50 years, stocks have made you money on a 10-year investment horizon.

It’s not like you lost lots of money when they did go down, either. At worst, if you had been unfortunate (or dumb) enough to invest in January 2000, by 2010 you had lost about 20%. You would have faced the same, a 20% loss,  in 1964 to 1974. Your upside risk, however, has been pretty assymetric, and in most 10 year periods you would at least have doubled your money, with triples, quintuples and zilliontuples common in the 10 year periods after 1980. That’s from a 60-year sample, which admittedly doesn’t include much in the way of catastrophe, revolution and property confiscation that has occurred in the stock market histories of other countries.  But still, equities look pretty good to me off this very basic analysis.

Clearly, just because in 90% of cases equities made you a positive 10 year return in the past is no guarantee it will continue in future periods. But I bet there were moaning minnies telling us stocks were dead at every point in this history. The onus has to be fairly put on the current stock-deniers to explain why they are right this time.

Myth 2: stocks and the economy are no longer linked

Brett Arends uses the Japanese example to illustrate this point: “since 1989 their economy has grown by more than a quarter, but the stock market is down more than three quarters”. He was probably well aware that this is a thoroughly exceptional example. This was number 4 in his top 10 list of “myths”, and I think he was already beginning to panic that he had 6 more to come up with still.

To be fair, the linkage between stocks and economies, while direct, is complicated. Companies’ share of GDP can increase or decrease while economies are booming or stagnating. Valuation is an extremely important filter. Extremes in the entry and exit point of when you actually invest can determines most of the result of the investment; Brett here chooses the very peak of the stockmarket and real estate bubble in Japan as his entry point for his trade. Not, I think you’ll agree, an exercise immune from sample size error.

The rest of the time, filters aside, stock prices are based on company earnings. When a company announces a better than expected quarter (nota bene,  better than investors expected, not the sell side consensus), the stock tends to go up. In their massive, millionaire-creating stock ramps, Apple and Google and Microsoft all went up because we realised they were going to earn much more in period n+1 than we thought at period n.

Fact is, economies tend to grow, and in a country with stable population it is productivity gains, doing more with the same or less, which is responsible. In other words, innovation equals growth. The repository of innovation, the sharing of ideas and the investment to put them into practice is the private sector, in the vast R&D departments of major enterprises and fast moving startups. May I refer you to the cod Hayekian but still excellent work of fellow Collegiant Matt Ridley for a longer exposition of this. That’s what you buy when you buy equities, that’s what you incentivise when you ask for shares in an IPO. You are driving and partipating in economic growth. Economies grow, company earnings tend to go up, and shares tend to rise. Simple really. Don’t lose sight of the forest for the trees.

Myth 3. The Machines are in charge. The Humans should give up.

Algo-bots sort of rule. Machines dominate lots of daily flow, and make it weird. But they don’t determine the forward PE ratio of e.g. Cisco. We do, and by its own lights the reasoning behind stocks being where they are is sound — if we double-dip, CSCO and everyone else will see their earnings fall, and so stocks trade at lower PEs than their long-term growth track record implies they should. Consensus estimates, the denominator of the PE, do not include the possibility of another recession. The punters, who are not paid to be bullish, don’t trust the numbers and are partially pricing it in.

So we don’t need to blame the algos and high frequency traders for our long positions going wrong. Hedge fund dudes, market makers, and lots of people whose livelihood is exploiting the shorter term moves in the stock market, DO have potential grounds to complain. Their jobs have become harder because of the bots, whose job after all is to scalp the humans. But this is not a reason to give up on stock market mechanisms that still reward medium-term savvy investment decisions.

Listen: the markets are always hard. Its supposed to be like that. Oddly enough, rather than blaming themselves, people like to have someone else to pin it on when their investments go wrong. In the 1990s they used to blame daytraders for driving internet rubbish to great heights, then in the naughties the shadowy “Plunge Protection Team” was the scourge of the bears. These days the bots are the scapegoat. The bots will one day overreach — if they ever really “ran” the market they would very quickly stop making money; trying to scalp each other would not be a good idea. Relax, and learn to love the bots. Whatever bogeyman that replaces them may be much scarier.

Myth 4. Higher volatility = Sell your stocks. We are in a period of higher volatility

This is just SO VERY WRONG that Baruch has to bite his fist. Were it not the thesis behind Felix Salmon’s call to sell all stocks (backed up by some pointy-headed algebra) the midst of the sovereign debt bruhaha of not so very long ago, Baruch would merely have ignored it. To have Felix (Felix!) tell us this is like hearing someone you respect and admire tell you the moon landings were faked by the guy on the grassy knoll, that the US military invented AIDS and that people from Harvard Business School are capable of independent thought. You want to edge away, slowly.

Historically, higher volatility is actually the long investor’s friend. It is associated with stress, periods of fear and panic — in other words buying opportunities, not good points at which to sell. Similarly, low volatility is associated with periods of complacency and is often, but certainly not always, a good point to sell. It’s easy to act pro-cyclical. Buying “at the sound of cannons” is very hard when the cannons are actually going off. Selling is a much more natural reaction, and brings very quick relief. You can feel a very virtuous disgust at stocks, vow never to go near them again, and go and buy some 10 year T-bonds at a 2.4% yield.

Of course, this is a terrible mistake. All you have done is maximise your losses, and give up on the idea of ever making them back. No less an authority than Mrs Baruch, herself an accomplished investor, characterised selling at high volatilty and buying at low volatility a “catastrophic” idea when Baruch told her about it. In order to make money in equities you have to invoke the Costanza Doctrine, ie do The Opposite — the opposite of what you feel like doing, and the opposite of what everyone is telling you to do. The fact that very few people are actually clear-headed enough to do this is probably why equities as an asset class are increasingly unpopular.

Truth 1: everything else is screwed. If you need to invest, you will likely buy some stocks even if you don’t want to

The tragedy is, of course, that equities are the coming thing. No other asset class, at the moment, seems to have the same combination of great fundamentals and juicy valuation. Bonds while the 10-year yields you 3% in a period of heightened risk on sovereign solvency? Puh-leeze. Gold? Who the hell knows with the weirdos on either side of that trade. Commodities may be good, what do I know, but as an asset class they’re probably not suitable for more than 25% of your allocation. Real Estate? Maybe that’s not a bad idea either, but I refer to the answer I just gave on commodities. Also property tends to not be very liquid. Art? Wines? Antique cars? Be my guest. The dirty secret of alternative investments such as hedge funds and private equity is that most of them are disguised equity longs. Hedge funds generally feel much more comfortable being net owners of shares — Baruch has yet to see the multi-strat he works for go net short, for instance. Private equity needs healthy equity markets (and, if you ask me, naive ones) to make actual profits close to the otherwise fictional marks they carry on their books.

At the end of the day, however, it largely comes down to bonds versus stocks. You are going to be overweight stocks in the coming years. It might take some of you some time to actually bite the bullet, and you will do it at higher prices as a result, but you will do it. I look to no less an authority in this as the biggest, baddest bond investor in the world, PIMCO, who is getting into equities in a big way.

Right now, equity investors are being offered a win:don’t lose very much proposition. A double dip, the great fear of the equity markets, is at least partially priced in here, and the upside if we don’t double dip looks very good indeed. It’s a great moment for stocks.

There. You see?

Much is being made of this video among the various Apple groupie blogs.

Readers will of course recall the fascinating one-two punch on the iPad delivered by myself, Baruch, and my dear colleague in blogging, Bento. His contention was the the real audience for the iPad will be older people. It is, he wrote, “a complex computer, simplified”, perfect for those intimidated by all the fiddly things you have to do to make them work:

It does one thing at a time. Your finger is the cursor. There is no need to tap things twice before stuff happens. You are allowed to turn it off with the power button.

No, Baruch contended, or rather, yes, but it is also or primarily a simplified computer for busy, empowered women: who as a group are perfectly capable of doing all those fiddly things but who don’t see why they should have to.

So one might think, “bravo Bento, you finally got one over on that loudmouth Baruch; look at Virginia, the 99 year old lady in the video using the iPad as her first computer. Proof of your thesis.”

Ha! Not so fast! Because of course Virginia is also a woman.

No Stock Recommendations here; move along

Baruch recently found himself commenting on Wall Street Cheat Sheet, on a post by Damien Hoffman, who seems to really dislike Jim Cramer. The post was about some investigation of TheStreet.com by the SEC, which Damien thought highly amusing, perhaps because he also runs a competing subscription-based financial edutainment site. Now, Baruch doesn’t pay attention to Jim Cramer on TV, but in fact quite likes him in print. He reads his posts on theStreet.com, and respects his track record as a hedge fund manager and pioneer econo-blogger.  So Baruch felt a brief moment of annoyance about seeing someone he liked being unecessarily trashed, but soon his heart was filled with forgiveness and understanding again. We must not be too harsh; snark is Damien’s job, what he gets paid for. He is a financial blogger-journalist, and being cheeky about mainstream media figures is part of that David and Goliath thing blogging used to be all about.

Anyway, this post is only a bit about Jim Cramer and Damien Hoffman. The exchange got Baruch thinking about the differences between journalists/bloggers (or whatever you want to call them) and investors, and what it means to communicate about investments with the public. Baruch finds this terribly interesting, because of course as an amateur econo-blogger and a professional investor, he has a foot in both camps.

Some of Baruch’s best friends are, or have been, financial journalists and commentators, on blogs and print. Being a financial journalist is a good, interesting job, and very important to the proper functioning of a marketplace. Journalists can do things, find things out, and explain things the public and investors need to know in ways investment professionals can’t, at least without risking jail.

But in the end journalists are explainers, commentators. They are dependent on market participants to provide them with things to write about. They review what others do. They work with the huge advantage of hindsight. And when it comes to giving advice about what what should be done, most media commentators are no better than the rest of us. Probably worse; they don’t get as much practice at it.

The major problem that commentators have is that rewards are based on reputation. Praise from peers and increased readership is the only way they have of knowing how good at their jobs they are. This is dependent on how smart the writer sounds, rather than how good he or she is at giving actual foresight. It’s a difficult thing, having to appear smart all the time. A well publicised prediction gone wrong can be pretty devastating to a reputation and undo lots of less well-publicised predictions which went right. Many writers solve this problem by not making many predictions at all. This is why most analysis pieces in newspapers and mainstream blogs end up in prevarication and fence sitting. Most journalists these days are smart enough not to end their articles with the words “only time will tell” — but they may as well.

The need to constantly appear smart also incentivises some to find a shortcut. A good and quick way of appearing relatively smarter is to find some fellow commentator who has broken the cardinal rule of journalistic punditry and actually had a stab at predicting something in a clear, falsifiable way — and got it wrong. Pointing out someone’s errors is a good way to come up with copy when you can’t think of anything constructive to say.

Ironically, consumers of financial media are actually crying out for someone to tell them what to do, rather than the prevarication they are confronted with everywhere. So pundits who do state clear positions tend to get eyeballs pretty quick. This unsettles their peers, who are universally relieved when these outliers inevitably cock it up, and they can now write gleeful articles about how it was obvious their colleague didn’t really know what he was talking about in the first place. Realising this, even sites which purport to give readers actionable intelligence, such as Lex, don’t actually tell them what to do, which would be too risky. A conclusion is always hinted at, but never made as plain as ” we think you should sell”. Instead you get some coded priggishness, like the chairman of company X “should enjoy the view from the top while he can”. Which gives the Lex writer enough wiggle-room to appear clever whatever the outcome for shareholders. This is, after all, the point of his writing, which he would freely admit to you as well if you bought him a pint.

Compare financial journalists now to actual market participants. While every now and then hedge funds get in a feeding frenzy and will short your longs and go long your shorts if they think you are in distress, the rest of the time professional managers are remarkably civil about each other in print, in person, and in front of clients. They don’t have cat fights very often. Continue reading “No Stock Recommendations here; move along”

Econobloggers need their crisis back

I think so, dear readers. With the advent of peace and plenty, as we move to the broad sunlit uplands of The Recovery, I fear some of the spice has gone out of the commentary on sites like this one, and its friends. Where people used to read econoblogs to actually understand a crisis that CNN and Fox News soundbites didn’t seem to encompass anymore, as the meltdown recedes into the past there’s now just a dull ennui.  And with that, the econoblogosphere is moving back to where it used to be, which is to cater to a niche, broader than most, but a niche nonetheless, with a circumscribed influence.

The high point of bloggy “power”, we shall probably find in retrospect, was when a number of bloggers were invited to the US Treasury department and fed some by all accounts delicious cookies, as well as being ferociously spun to by the Goldmans guys whose turn it was to be on sabbatical at the Treasury that when it came to financial reform and what had gone wrong in the banking sector they did in fact Get It, whatever It was.

Since then, of course, we have had Obama praise the bonuses to “savvy businessman” Lloyd Blankfein, who as we all know is doing god’s work;  mind-numbingly massive “trading” profits from all the big commercial, investment, commercial investment banks at the same time as accepting government and Fed largesse*; an even more hideous clusterfuck over finance reform than exists over healthcare reform in the US; and this despite none of the proposals under discussion seeming likely to properly change anything worthwhile, other than maybe the Volcker prop trading rule and this last seems fairly dead in the water.

What really rankles this blogger is that the Great Spinozist Republic is being subverted again. Regulatory capture is one thing, the total inability of a political system to make any steps to reform itself when what is wrong is staring at you in the face, is quite another. Political money and public ignorance has corrupted civic decency in the US to such an extent that doing the right thing for the Republic appears quite impossible.

All these things should make econo-bloggers all quiver with righteous anger, which we would communicate to our readers who would then rise up en masse against the legislators captured by Big Banking, and some form of actual reform might even take place.

But something along the chain has broken. Either we have lost interest or, more likely, the world has. To be sure, there are brave souls who carry on the fight. Felix does an admirable job of keeping us up to date with the nuts and bolts of finance reform. Taibbi provides the rhetoric (“vampire squids”, indeed). Calculated Risk and Naked Capitalism carry on doing their thing, as does Zero Hedge in its batshit sawn-off shotgun way. TED gives us the lowdown and I mean low, on what it really means to be a banker (though TED’s next post is just as likely to be about his favourite type of upholstery. Thanks for including us in the list of blogs you read, BTW). There are others, and Abnormal Returns continues to aggregate them. But the rest of us seem to have stopped caring so much. The minutiae of practical policy is much less amusing than making lots of money in financial markets that really, truly appear to be on the mend.

The wider global economy seems to be much better too. Sure, the US seems a bit screwed up still, and unemployment is high, but frankly that’s not where the action is at anymore. Baruch was astonished to read that Gartner is predicting 20% year on year growth in PC units globally. We can talk about overleveraged consumers until we’re blue in the face and we’ll still be wrong. That’s a crapload of PCs, and someone’s buying them. You don’t sell craploads of PCs like that unless there was something going fundamentally right in more places than where things are going fundamentally wrong.

But a better economy just makes people fat and happy, and fat and happy people aren’t likely to be roused by righteous anger. Fat and happy people are not likely to want to change much. Fat and happy people are much more likely to assume the light at the end of the tunnel gives out onto a large outdoor buffet than the next oncoming crisis. Hell, fat and happy people are more likely to do the stuff to bring on the next crisis, to binge, to borrow more, stoke the next bubble wherever that may be and feel pretty smart doing so, just like we did in 2006 and 2007. Reformed Broker Josh captures the new Zeitgeist rather well just today when he lists the things people no longer appear to be interested in e.g. financial reform, unemployment, etc and says

most market participants have instead turned their focus to finding secular growth stories, deep-value high yielders to replace the lack of money market interest and other such assorted baskets to put their eggs in.

Fine with me.  I could use a break from the “news” myself.

I can’t say much better. Josh is saying what lots of us think.

Baruch isn’t really the person to do anything about this himself. He isn’t Spartacus. It was no co-incidence he was not invited to hob-nob at the Treasury; David at Aleph Blog was kind enough to suggest he and some others should be next time, but Baruch would probably have just eaten more of the cookies than was fair and got bored and played Homerun Battle 3D on his new iPhone until it ran out of power, annoying everyone. Baruch is one of those who likes to analyse what Is and try and make money out of it. He is not very interested in, or good at, what Should Be, though is slightly envious of those who have strong opinions in this direction. Less “designing better futures“, more buying the right ones. Even if Baruch had a prediliction to think about policy he doesn’t have time to think about more than what he writes about already; he has a day job, and a very intense one, which soaks up what mental energy he can muster these days.

But buying better futures are not what the best blogs in this space are about (and not what Nick Gogerty’s blog is either). Posts about the latest chart formation in the S&P500 are not memorable. They help no-one. Blogs about how best to trade can be interesting, but remain narrow and mercenary. So in the end are posts about how many iPads Apple will sell, the stock-in-trade of UB recently. Myself and Bento are just not that qualified to do much else and don’t have the time to post as often as we want. But there are other bloggers who are and who can. At its best, the econo-blogosphere can be the last haven of truly independent, non-captured, and crucially, informed, commentary able to affect policy and opinion makers positively. It used to do just that. It may not help in the end but let someone at least try.

Get your game back on, people. Get some fire in the belly again. A crisis is a terrible thing to waste, and it looks like we are on the verge of wasting ours.

* the irony is of course, is that the millions in banker wodge financing the lobbyists is at least partly the hot money doled out by the Fed to banks in that extraordinary money machine called ” quantitative easing”: Fed buys up at full whack the treasuries it issues to banks at a discount, financed by cheap rates set by the Fed itself. Said banks, busting out with Fed-invented cash, or more properly, “trading profits”, refuse to lend it to small businesses like they’re supposed to in the textbooks and support the economy. No, they plow it into awarding themselves big bonuses and, most pricelessly, pay lobbyists to pay off politicians to subvert both good sense and a public opinion which is as viscerally opposed to big banking as it is ignorant and pliant, and make sure the status quo ante crisum is restored. An edifying spectacle.